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by 
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In this paper I seek to do three related things: to identify the dominant mode of 
production in the Swazi social formation and other possible subsidiary modes; to 
establish the existence or otherwise of classes in Swazi society; and to elucidate 
the development of the Swazi state. Before I start, however, I should like to make 
two disclaimers. Firstly, I make no pretence at theoretical rigour and have merely 
used the concepts employed in this paper to illuminate my material. Secondly, the 
questions raised by such concepts are not easily answered by the data I have at ay 
disposal. Swazi tradition,I do not doubt,will help to give answers to those questions, 
but first it will be necessary for those questions to be posed. This I did not do 
during my own fieldwork in Swaziland, and for that reason much of my paper will have 
a provisional ring. Nevertheless, despite these limitations I feel justified in 
venturing into this field. Swazi society does not, as far as I can see, fit into 
recent categorizations of pre-capitalist modes of production, and its study may help 
in developing those categories further. At the same time the questions raised by this 
mode of analysis undoubtedly turn the spotlight on neglected areas of Swazi society 
and, even if only partially or provisionally answered, must help our understanding of 
how that society works. For that reason I make no apologies at undertaking such an 
analysis and merely ask that it be taken as much as a progranme for research as the 
fruits of a completed project. 
The Tributam Mode of Production 
Hindess and Hirst define a mode of production as "an articulated combination 
of relations and forces of production structured by the dominance of the relations of 
productionff. "The relations of productiont1, they go on, "define a specific mode of 
appropriation of surplus labour and the specific form of social distribution of the 
means of productions corresponding to that mode of appropriation of surplus labour." 
The implications of the notions of articulation and of dominance are of particular 
significance for the present study. Later Hindess and Hirst make the point that lfa 
distinct structure of relations of production supposes a set of forces of production 
which corresponds to the conditions of the labour process it establishesl1, and go on 
to reject the concept of an Asiatic mode of production on the grounds that "the 
conditions of appropriation of surplus labour [entailed by this mode] do not transform 
the labour process or the relation of the labourer to itV1. As a result, the relation 
of the relations of production and the forces of production are characterized by "a 
necessary arbitrarinessll, and the conditions of proving the existence of the mode -of 
production are not met, i.e. forces cannot be deduced from the relations of 
production. (1) 
This is no small matter, as the mode of production characteristic of most 
African social formations seems to correspond more closely to the Asiatic mode of 
production than to any other, and once this is rejected the bulk of African and 
indeed other social formations known to history are relegated to some kind of 
tlmodeless'l imbo. An alternative must, therefore, be found, or else in one guise or 
other the Asiatic mode must be revived, What, in the first place, are the possible 
alternatives? In Hindess and Hirstls classification the two most likely candidates 
are the feudal mode of production and what they term the second variant of the 
primitive communist mode. The second vmiant of the primitive communist mode of 
production corresponds to what Rey and others have called the lineage mode of 
production. (2) Its identifying characteristics are communal appropriation of the 
social product and its extended or vcomplexll redistribution among the lineage members. 
Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of whether the lineage mode of production 
is characterized by classes or is classless, it is clear that it has been widely 
distributed across the continent of Africa. Whether or not that means that this has 
been the dominant mode of production is, however, an entirely different question, for 
almost wherever one looks one,finds the lineage mode combined into other aggregates 
like the village or the kingdom, which themselves require definition in terms of modes 
of production. 
Can these larger aggregates be considered as variants of the feudal mode of 
production? In Hindess and Hirstls terms they cannot, for, whereas the feudal mode 
of production presupposes a ruling class which exists independently of the state 
machine, direct producers who are politically and. legally bound to their exploiters 
through the right of eminent domain and the absence of communal production, most, 
if not all, of the larger collectivities of which we have been speaking are 
characterized by the absence of an exploiting class independent of the state, the 
absence of private property in land, and communal production. (3) The differences 
implied by all this cannot be reduced simply to matters of scale. Amin, for example, 
suggests that the feudal mode of production is only a decentralized and regressive 
varient of the tributary mode of production (which he sees as the dominant mode of 
production for most of the world's history), inasmuch ss the ri&ts to tribute and to 
ownership previously vested in the state have reverted during periods of weakness to 
individual feudal lords. (4) In fact, the difference between the two is far more 
fundamental than that. In the feudal mode of production,the mechanism for the 
appropriation of surplus (feudal rent) and the property relations which go with that 
involve extensive control over the labour process on the part of the feudal lord, and 
for this reason this excludes the possibility ~f communal production. (5) In other 
words, the forces of production axe structured by the relations of production and can, 
therefore, be deduced from them. In the tributary mode of production, on the other 
hand (which includes the Asiatic mode), no such intensive or continuous structuration 
of the labour process takes place. Production can be either independent peasant or 
communal, and the exploiter has a purely external relation to the process of production, 
intervening to exact tribute (or tax/rent in Hindess a3ld Hirstls terms) only once the 
production process is complete. (6) Consequently, the forces of production are not 
in any meaningful way structured by the relations of produotion, they cannot be 
deduced from one another, and the existence of the tributary or Asiatic mode of 
production remains unproved. 
Does this mean that there are no modes of production corresponding to the 
larger aggregates of kingdom or chiefdom, and that we are forced back on some kind of 
notion of hegemony which is rooted in but not comprehended by the lineage mode? (7) 
I think not. As Taylor suggests in his review of Hindess and Hirst, the relations of 
production established in the Asiatic mode of production are compatible only with 
communal forces of production, and I am inclined to think that this is true of all 
tributary formations, since other quasi-feudal mechanisms for structuring and 
reproducing the labour process would be necessary if communal ones were abandoned. 
At the same time Taylor also suggests that the state in the Asiatic mode of production 
is, in fact, obliged to intervene in the process of production by building canals and 
the like so as to secure its reproduction. (8) This type of large-scale intervention 
has been relatively uncommon in Africa, a fact which has prompted Godelier to describe 
the African mode of production as the Asiatic mode without large works. (9) Other 
kinds of intervention do, nevertheless, occur. Among the Pedi,regiments of young men 
axe organize6 by the chief to build walls and agricultural terracing, while, in the 
view of Guy, the Zulu state came into being at least partly because of the varied 
nature of Zulu ecology and the need to rationalize access to diverse kinds 
of pastures and soils. (10) More generally, the provision of security enables the 
reproduction of production, and prevents the indiscriminate plundering which is often 
the fate of acephalous groups. (11) In the Swazi state, one sees these interventions 
of several similar kinds: control of access to various zones of pasturage, control 
of the size and reproduction of individual homesteads throw witchcraft accusations, 
and control over the cycle of agricultural production throw the annual incwala 
ceremony, and through the withdrawal of young men from the agricultural cycle into 
centralized age regiments. In sum, then, there seems to me to be sufficient 
articulation between the forces and relations of production for us to reconsider the 
possibility of tributary mode, although the task of actually specifying that in a way 
that is theoretically coherent I shall leave to those who are more theoretically 
sound . 
Social Classes, Politics and the State 
"No classes, no politics, no staten is a passage that recurs in the pages 
of Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production. What are its implications for tributary modes 
of production in general, and for that of the Swazi in particular? Following m l s ,  
Hindess and Hirst see the existence of the state and of politics as an effect of the 
social division of labour, i.e. of the existence of social classes. In social 
formations such as these, !'the political level exists as the necessary space for the 
representation of the interests of the various classes, and the presence of a state 
apparatus is a necessary condition of the maintenance and functioning of the mechanism 
of appropriation of surplus labour by the ruling classv. (12) Otherwise, where social 
classes are absent, the state and politics do not exist and the social formation is 
constituted only of economic and ideological levels. Given this definition, it is 
obviously important to impart some precision to our notion of class, and to see 
whether classes can then be identified in tributary, and particularly the Swazi, social 
formation. In Marxian theory, the separation of society into social classes arises 
from the social division of labour between a class of labourers who are separated from 
ownership of the means of production and a class of non-labourers who control the means 
of production, and use this as the means of appropriating surplus labour. On the basis 
of this definition, Hindess and Hirst reject outright the possibility of social classes 
in the primitive communist mode of production. Since the mode of appropriation of 
surplus labour is communal, they insist, there are ipso facto no classes, and hence no 
possibility of politics and the state. (13) Both Rey and T e q  take the opposite 
view, asserting that control by elders over women in the first case and over prestige 
goods in the other enabled the elders llto control the surplus product, the partial or 
total use of which is for the reproduction of relations of dependence between the direct 
producers and this group", and out of this process they consider class relations to 
emerge. (14) Without wishing to enter that debate, there does seem to be one point 
that should be made, which is that, if Hindess and Hirst see "the process of the 
formation of the state [as] identical to the process of transition from primitive 
communism to some other mode of production", and if they consider transitions from 
one mode of production to another to be the product of class struggle, some kind of 
embryonic class formation must be possible in that mode for the transition ever to 
occur. (15) 
It is that kind of embryonic class formation that seems to me to characterize 
tributary fomations in general and that of the Swazi in particular. Its origins may 
perhaps be traced to the process outlined by Meillassoux. 
Throw historical accidents, usually due to contacts 
with foreign formations, a group takes for all its 
members the quality of 'senior' in relation to other 
groups considered collectively as minor. All the 
economic and social prerogatives of the elder are 
transferred to the dominant class, usually an 
aristocratic lineage. Prestations due to the elder 
become tributes due to the lord who maJr also gain 
control over the matrimonial policy of the community, 
and eventually over the means of production - land. (16) 
Meillassoux~s conception suffers in some measure from the role it ascribes to 
historical accidents, which in themselves presumably ought to be explained. 
Thereafter, however, it is possible to see these embryonic classes taking firmer 
shape. To take the Swazi case as an example, participation in the trade to Delagoa 
Bay and the ruling groups' monopolization of its profits helped further boost the 
latter's power, which in turn was consolidated still further by their move to the 
Shiselweni district in the south of modem Swaziland, and the opportunities this 
presented for enforcing unequal access to unevenly distributed means of production. 
Part of that process I have dealt with elsewhere, and I should like to turn instead 
to the second phase of Swazi eqansion,which took place at the beginning of the 
1820s. (17) 
At this point, it is worth noting the comments of Hindess and Hirst on the 
conquest situation. llConquest", they point out, 
does not of itself produce state domination. The 
conquering people are not phantoms, they existed 
prior to the conquest and they must have a social 
organisation and a mode of producing the means of 
subsistence. In the first instance, the conquerorfs 
mode of production will be represented alongside 
that of the dominated people. The dominant people 
receive tribute which is redistributed according to 
their social institutions and relations of 
production. No state is formed by this relation, 
dominant people/subject people; the means of 
coercion to obtain tribute are provided by the 
Gentile constitution of the dominant people, and 
the subject people regulates its own affairs by its 
own institutions. The fact of conquest does not 
produce either class society or the state. m e  
conditions of transition to class society, of the 
conversion of the conquerors into a non-labouring 
ruling class, are not piven in conquest as such. 
If such a transition does take place then it is on 
the basis of class society and irreconcilable class 
antagonism that the state is formed, not on the 
basis of conquest. Conquest only explains certain 
conditions under which the state =be formed, it 
does not explain the mechanisms of the formation of 
the state. (18) 
Conditions in the Swazi conquest area almost exactly mirror those outlined above. 
For several years the Swazi resembled more closely an arqy of occupation camped out 
in hostile territory than a settled administration. "In those early days", one oral 
history recalls, "there were no chiefs, only princes and leaders of regiments" (19) , 
and the same picture can be derived from the evidence of Swazi messengers to Captain 
Gardiner when they visited I'Qmgundlovu in 1835. The capital of Swaziland, they told 
him, was Elangeni, and a little to the south was another village of Labamba, which 
between them housed the entire male population of the Swazi, numbering no more than 
a few hundred men. (20) The messengers were evidently exaggerating, no doubt for 
Zulu ears, as we know of much inore extensive Swazi settlement in this period, 
especially in the South. (21) Yet, in the area of conquest, there was an element of 
truth in what they said. Few of Sobhuzals brothers or sons were assigned chiefdoms 
in the central areas until the closing years of Sobhuza's life, and the type of 
"placing" to which Kuper refers did not occur on any extensive scale until the reign 
of his successor. (22) The history of Maphalaleni illustrates the trend. Maphalaleni 
was established for Id'Tdwandwe, one of Sobhuzars favourite wives, but so late in 
Sobhuzals reign that by the time she got there Sobhuza was already dead. (23) The 
same pattern repeats itself t h r o ~ o u t  central Swaziland. Neither Maloyi nor mlunge 
seem to have taken effective occupation of their chiefdoms in the Mbulwane River area 
until the reign of Mswati, and on the north side of the Komati River none of the 
Hhohho district was even allocated until the 1840s a d  1850s. (24) In the south, 
things were somewhat different. At least five of Sobhuzats sons were given chiefdoms 
there, but,if Mantintinti is anything to go by, they only took possession comparatively 
late in Sobhuzals reign. (25) After accompanying Sobhuza to Mdimba, Mantintinti 
"never set foot alive" in the chiefdom he had been given, and it was only "during the 
time of the retuxn of the princestt to neighbouring Velezezweni that his successor 
Mtfonga "was instructed to return". (26) In sum, then, the story told to Gardiner is 
at least partially confirmed. In the area of conquest the Ngwane were, for most of 
Sobhuzafs reign, a nation under arms. Little of the conquered territory was settled, 
and the bulk of the population clustered for security in military towns. Only in the 
final years of Sobhuza's reign did the situation begin to change. Men could now be 
spared to reinforce the south, and an administrative presence was gradually extended 
in the conquered zone. Imperceptibly a shift was taking place to a society less 
overtly parasitic, and less openly reliant on the naked use of force. 
The same process of integration accelerated in the reign of Sobhuzals 
successor, Mswati (1839-1865). Almost as soon as Mswati succeeded his father he was 
faced with a rebellion by his half-brother, Fokoti, and once that had been put down 
Mswati's mother, Thandile, and his paternal uncle, Malung;e, took it as the opportunity 
to set in motion a series of far-reaching reforms. On the face of it these took mainly 
political and ritual forms. The ritual supremacy of the king as expressed in annual 
incwala (first fruits) ceremonies was bolstered by ritual importations from the 
Ndwandwe, and Swaziland's military and administrative structures were systematized by 
creating nation-wide age regiments as the framework of Swazilandfs military organization, 
and by establishing a far more extensive network of royal villages to serve both as 
rallying points for regiments and as centres for monitoring and supervising local 
political activity. (27) The rationale behind these changes was not, ho?,rever, so.lely 
political or ritual. The withdrawal of young men from the agricultural cycle of their 
families! homesteads involved the direct appropriation of surplus labour by the royal 
house, since they were then set to work tilling the king's fields, while changes in the 
incwala ceremonies and the establishment of royal villages in the provinces were part 
of a wider process whereby members of the royal family were being dispersed into the 
regions, as a means of securing control over all aspects of their activities, including 
the process of production. (28) Why this was needed now is less easy to judge, but 
the most likely explanation is Swazilandts declining ability to raid for booty and 
tribute in the regions to the north and the west in the troubled period following 
Sobhuzals death. Under Sobhuza, such raiding had been widely undertaken. Thonga 
traditions collected by Nachtigal are full of references to Swazi attacks, and when 
Trichardt passed by the Pedi in 1836 he was warned that the entire area to the west 
of the Steenkampsberg was under Swazi oontrol. (29) By the time the trekkers arrived 
in the area in the mid-1840~~ however, Swazi raiding had all but ceased, and it may 
well have been the shortage of surplus from these "traditional" sources in a period of 
stress that caused a tightening of the mechanisms of surplus extraction in Swaziland 
itself. (30) 
The programme of reform evoked immediate opposition, and before long the 
regents were forced to back down by a coalition of regional interests. (31) Further 
action in the matter had to await the mid-1850s as &wati and his regents were 
confronted in rapid succession by the rebellions of two of his elder brothers and by 
two massed Zulu attacks. (32) 1852, however, marked the end of Zulu attacks, and Zulu 
energies were henceforth consumed by internal manglings over the succession. (33) 
As a result, Mswati was able to bring the country more systematically under his control, 
as is evidenced by his attacks on the semi-autonomous EkwkAandzambile chiefs (meaning 
"those found aheadt1, i.e. those chiefdoms which had occupied central and northern 
Swaziland prior to Sobhuzats arrival from the south). Of the nineteen Ehakhandzaabile 
l cliiefdoms about which I have definite information, fourteen suffered in some way or 
other during this period, and in the cases of the others it required the intervention 
of special factors or unusual circumstances to save them from a similar fate. Thus 
l the Mnisi, the Thabedze, the Gamedze, the Plngometfulo, the Sifundza, the Masilela, and 
the Mavimbela were all attacked by Mswatils forces, and it is also reported that the 
chiefdoms of the Mahlalela and Movenits Magqpla would also have experienced similar 
treatment, had it not been for the intercession of chance on the one h a d  and a trusted 
royal relative on the other. (34) As for the others, their autonomies were no less 
completely circumscribed, with the Ngwenya, the Dladla, the Mncina and the Moyenils 
Magagula being demoted and placed under tmated officers of Mswati. (35) 
It would, of course, be absurd to assume that all this was undertaken in the 
immediate interests of surplus appropriation. In the case of the Mnisi, for example, 
their chiefdom was attacked because of -the extensive rain-making powers their chief 
deployed, axld ritual factors may have entered into Mswatils attack on others as well.(36) 
Nevertheless, underlying most of these assaults one can see attempts to extend politico/ 
economic control. In aany instances it is difficult to sepaxate these two levels. The 
Mavimbela, for exmqle, were attacked because they refused a royal wife from Mswati, 
and on the face of it were reacting against the extension of political control. Yet 
for them there was another dimension to the problem, since marrying a princess involved 
the payment of inflated sums of bridewealth and so meant a heavy drain of cattle as 
well. (37) In other cases, economic issues are more clearly defined. Thus, when 
Mswati tried to extort tribute from the Sifundza and Masilela peoples during a period 
of droup$t, for example, his party was intercepted as it returned,and stripped of all 
that it had taken. Mswati did not react immediately, but, according to tradition, bided 
his time until the offenders' fears had been lulled. A more serious consideration was 
probably fear of the Zulu, since it is likely that these events took place in the 
drought of 1848. Once the Zulu threat had begun to recede, however, the Masilela were 
made to p w  dearly for their crimes. A hunting party was arranged to which the 
Masilela were summoned, and they were then surrounded and annihilated by the rest of 
the assembled host. (38) 
The process whereby Fkwati extended and rationalized his political and 
economic control over subject groups I would see as marking the beginning of class 
society and the emergence of the state. In the place of random and indiscriminate 
plundering one now finds the development of more institutionalized mechanisms for 
the appropriation of surplus, whose volume was at the same time kept within reasonable 
limits by the need to retain the loyalty and co-operation of subject groups against 
external enemies like the Zulu. Side by side one also discerns the developing 
institutions of the state: the age regiments, which socialized the youth of subject 
peoples into a sense of national identity, and whose labour and booty raiding 
enriched the dominant class; the expanded libandla or national council which 
represented all interests in the country and whose participation was required for all 
major political decisions (though here Hindess and Hirstls comments on the means of 
representation should also be remembered) (39); the annual incwala ceremony in which 
the king aYld his people are symbolically renewed each year, and. so on. Whether at 
this embryonic stage they should be considered as existing entirely independently of 
the ruling gxoups is obviously open to question. Yet the same question remains open 
in the case of the feudal state. The extent to which or manner in which this operates 
"as the necessary space for the representation of the various classes" in the feudal 
mode of prod.uction is never properly elaborated by Hindess and Hirst, leaving one with 
a lingering suspicion that even here it only partially fulfils that role. 
The last question that I wish to consider in this section is the precise 
configuration of class interests represented in the early Swazi state. Terray, in his 
recent article on llCla.sses and Class Consciousness in the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman", 
ultimately ducks that very question. He begins by defining classes in terms of 
relations to the means of production, but then goes on to characterize them as a 
relation of exploitation. (40) This will not do, for as Hindess and Hirst,among others, 
have shown, there may be exploitation without classes ever arising, as in the case of 
"banditry and extortion by political tbosses'". (41) Can we therefore say we have 
classes in pre-colonial Swaziland? I believe we can, if only in embryonic form. 
Firstly, land, the basis of the economic system and the principal means of production, 
is controlled by the rulers and. can be redistributed by them in a variety of ways. 
Chiefdoms can have part of their territory taken away from them and allocated to other 
groups; they can be removed en masse to other parts of the country, or they can have 
their local rulers replaced by relatives and functionaries of the king. (42) Thus, 
while each individual subject has access to the means of production, he can have his 
access restricted to means of greatly inferior worth. Much the same goes for cattle 
and for wives. By a variety of mechanisms such as witchcraft accusations, control over 
the appropriate combinations of pasturage, variable bridewealth payments, and 
preferential marriage patterns, the accumulation of cattle can be restricted for the 
commoners and largely confined to the ruling class. (43) If one adds to this an 
appropriation of surplus on the basis of these divisions, which goes to maintain a 
non-labouring ruling class, then one must concede the emergence of class society if 
only in attenuated form. 
But the question remains: W ~ Q  precisely constitute these classes? In his 
study of the Abron Kingdom of Gyaman,Terray sees a three-class division between a non- 
labouring group of aristocrats and a class of working slaves, on the one hand, and 
tribute-producing peasants, on the other, but it seems questionable to me how clear- 
cut this distinction was. (44) Are we to believe, for example, that the Abron 
aristocracy was an entirely non-labouring class and that neither its women nor its 
cadets engaged in productive work? Certainly among the Swazi this was not the case, 
for there a large section of the ruling group took part in such pursuits. Instead, 
we find there is a more complicated situation, with tribute being extracted from 
subordinate groups in the various forms that we have mentioned, and then being partly 
concentrated in the upper echelons of the ruling class and partly filtering down. The 
important thing to remember here, however, is the barrier that existed to surplus 
dribbling down to the groups from which it had been drawn. Essentially, this was 
constituted out of Swazi marriage practices. Unlike their Nguni counterparts, the 
Swazi practised a system of preferential in-kin marriages, which tended to restrict 
cattle and other wealth to within the ruling class. These restrictions, it is true, 
were neither permanent nor impermeable. The marriage of mtrilateral cross-cousins 
is much more flexible than its patrilateral parallel variant, which fixes genealogical 
relationships in a virtually unchanging rhythm, and it was this the Swazi practised 
rather than the more inflexible kind. (45) The Swazi, moreover, marry their 
classificatory cross-cousins and not their actual mother's brother's daughters, and 
have preferential marriages with a variety of other kin. (46) Finally, a more general 
political expediency could involve an entirely different order of preference, and led 
Mswati to exchangr! wives with both Magagula chiefs. (47) From the broader structural 
point of view, however, the relationships which developed with the conquered were 
decisively different from those of other J!Tgun;i groups. Although offering a more 
flexible range of marriage options than parallel and true cross-cousin marriage, the 
various Swazi marriage preferences still concentrated them within a restricted group 
of kin. (48) The broad effect of this was that, while a degree of social and political 
mobility was permitted, differences of political and social status were perpetuated, 
which persist to this day. In Sobhuzags time these were at their most intense. 
Marriages were confined politically within the dominant Ngwane, and spatially to their 
militazy encampments, while wealth tended to circulate in %he same restricted group. 
Under Mswati there was a blurring at the edges of these categories, but otherwise they 
remained eseen.tially intact, leaving marriage practices to continue as a crucial 
determinant of class. 
Captives and Booty Raiding in the Tributary Mode of Production 
Jack Goody, in his essays on Tradition, Technology and the State in Africa, 
sees captives and tributary raiding as an integral part of the tributary mode of 
production (although he does not use that term). The low fertility of African soils, 
the relatively low level of technology in most African societies (which make human 
muscle power virtually the only means of power available), and low population 
densities, together make it impossible to extract surplus from peasant communities on 
a scale similar to much of Asia and Europe, and ensure that it is labour rather than 
land that is the factor of production which is scarce. Out of this arises booty raiding 
as an important means of acquiring surplus, and particularly the raiding of human booty 
as a source of labour. (49) Terray, in his Gyman study, refines these ideas further. 
The low level of surpluf, appropriation from peasarit communities, he suggests, is a 
consequence of the need of ruling aristocracies to enlist the support of peasant 
communities in the face of threats from outside. At the same time the fear of creating 
a permanently dispossessed and disaffected slave population, as well as perhaps other 
factors, ensures the gradual absorption of the captive and his family into G y m  
society, and created the need to secure fur%her supplies of captives as a means of 
making good that loss. (50) A number of the same points apply to Swazi society. 
The part played by captives in the Swazi economy has been considerably larger 
than is generally iyzsined. Whether this was always the case is difficult to say. When 
the Swazi were centred on Shiselweni in the south of Swaziland between c.1770-1820, for 
example, their highly pastoral economy may have meant that their neeafor labour power 
were correspondingly reduced. The situation changed once they moved from Shiselweni to 
Ezulwini. Here the pasturage was less rich and agricultural production more necessary, 
and henceforth captives were raided on all sides. (51) According to Ndambi Mkhonta, 
the Ezulwini village once boasted large numbers of captives, and the same is likely 
to be true of all royal capitals. (52) Other examples which I have come across 
without directly questioning on the subject are those of the Dube, who were attacked 
and. enslaved in the reign of Mswati, and of the Thabede who suffered a similar fate at 
much the same time. (53) Sources of slaves fell in two broad categories, although the 
distinction was probably blwed in the early days of the state. The first group 
cornprised non-Swazi who were raided outside their kingdom's boundaries (the 
~itfunjwa). (54) In Sobhuzars early conflicts with the chiefdoms of Magoboyi and 
rllirise, for example, captives were taken and their presence in Swazi society was used 
irs later years to justify Mswatils right to cede the eastern Transvaal. (55) Later 
it was the Thonga who bore the brunt of these attacks and it was they who, in this 
case, were most usually traded as slaves. The other major source of supply were 
children seized from households within the Swazi kingdom (the ~igcili) . (56) As 
Tikuba told Stuart in 1898: 
It often happened that when a person was killed for 
some crime or other and his cattle and children seized, 
those children were taken by the Swazi and sold to the 
Boers in the Transvaal. (57) 
The Berlin missionary, Meremky, reported on similar practices after his visit to 
Swaziland in March 1860. ltEben nowtr, he wrote in his diary, 
if a man of his [Mswatifs] people has many dau&ters 
or good cattle his soldiers come, surround the -1, 
murder the old, and take the young people and cattle 
as booty. Children are being sold or given to the 
'great of the realml. (58) 
What were the implications of these developments for the emergence of the 
state and for the development of classes? Terrw would have us believe that they 
signal the emergence of slave classes and of a slave mode of production, but,as Hindess 
and Hirst show, a slave mode of proeuction presupposes private property in land and 
slaves, and a form of commodity exchange corresponding to both. (59) Moreover, given 
the ri&ts and protection made available to captives in Swazi society, it seems more 
appropriate to regard them as a group of perpetual minors rather than as a clearly 
defined class. (60) The seizure of captives, however, did have other implications for 
class formation, particularly when considered against the trade in captives to the 
Transvaal. Without going into any details, this seems to have grown to substantial 
proportions by the middle of the 1850s and then to have boomed to new levels for the 
first half of the next decade. (61) The question that is inevitably raised by these 
developments is to what extent the seizure of captives for trade became an object in 
Ttself in the attacks that were made on offending subject groups, and to what extent, 
in Rodneyl s terms, this led to the social degeneration of Swazi society. (62) Or, to 
pu-t it another way, to what extent do we see a robber relation rather than a class 
relation characterizing Swazi society? I would argue that for the most part the seizure 
of captives did not become the object of these attacks; that they were a by-product 
of rationalizing economic and political control, aYld that, once this rationalization 
was completed, internal captive-taking largely ceased. In its place, however, one 
finds a shift of emphasis to Mozambique, the devastation and impo-ferishment of that 
area in the pursuit of captives, and perhaps some of the earliest origins of the 
underdevelopment of southern Mozambique. (63) 
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